It is widely assumed that distraction reduces pain. Similarly, it is assumed that pain distracts from concurrent, unrelated cognitive processing, reducing performance on difficult tasks. Taken together, these assumptions suggest pain processing and cognitive function engage an overlapping set of domain-general, capacity-limited mental resources. However, experimental tests of this proposal have yielded mixed results, leading to alternative proposals that challenge the common model of a bidirectional relationship between concurrent pain and task performance. We tested these contrasting positions using a novel concurrent pain and executive working memory paradigm. Both task difficulty and nociceptive stimulus intensity were individually calibrated for each participant. Participants reported less pain during the working memory task than a visually matched control condition. Conversely, increasing levels of heat incrementally reduced task performance. Path analyses showed that variations in pain completely mediated this effect, and that even within a given heat level, trial-by-trial fluctuations in pain predicted decrements in performance. In sum, these findings argue that overlapping cognitive resources play a role in both pain processing and executive working memory. Future studies could use this paradigm to understand more precisely which components of executive function or other cognitive resources contribute to the experience of pain. Ó
Introduction
It is commonly assumed that distraction reduces pain. Also common is the assumption that pain captures attention, reducing performance on difficult mental tasks [25] . Taken together, these assumptions imply a tradeoff between the experience of pain and goal-directed task performance [42] . When tradeoffs are observed between two concurrently performed tasks, it may be inferred that the tasks overlap in the mental resources they engage, and that the processing capacity of these resources is limited [51] . Applying this logic to the tradeoff between performance and pain suggests the same executive resources that are believed to support goal-directed mental functioning may also play a role in the experience of pain.
Extensive research has tested the common wisdom assumption that pain engages domain-general cognitive resources in nonhuman animals [ (Fig. 1): I. pain ratings or other indices of pain experience are reduced by unrelated, concurrent, cognitive demand; II. cognitive performance is reduced by concurrent pain.
Research in which healthy humans are exposed to transient pain balances the experimental control afforded by animal studies and the applicability and specificity possible in research with chronic pain patients (Table 1) .
Looking at these studies in total, the results are surprising. While many found that participants reported less pain when task demand was greater [1,2,12,20,27,33,34,39,40,54,56-58,62,64, 70,71,74,79], a large number found no effect of increased task demand [35, 56, 59, 63, 64, 72] . Furthermore, only a few studies have reported a decline in cognitive performance as a function of pain [2,14,35], while most have found no effect [12, 16, 17, 35, 39, 54, 56, [63] [64] [65] 74, 78] . This paucity of supportive findings has given rise to alternative proposals that task demand does not reduce concurrent pain [45, 49] , that pain does not reduce concurrent performance [74] , and that pain and goal-directed cognitive performance can occur simultaneously without meaningful interaction [63, 64] . All of these proposals challenge the common model of a bidirectional relationship between pain and goal-directed cognitive performance.
Alternatively, conceptual and methodological factors may account for the lack of support for the shared resources model found
